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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The use of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC)
is a growing phenomenon in Latin America and globally.1
Within the Western Hemisphere, PMSCs assist International
Organizations during humanitarian operations, as in Haiti
after the massive earthquake. Simultaneously, these
companies provide intelligence, logistic and training to
support the Colombian Army. Contractors are also working
for other private enterprises providing security services in
risky situations all around the region. The privatization of
security activities produces binary effects: it exacerbates
tensions between international interventions and the local
population as well as erodes State control over security
issues.
The growing use of PMSCs by the extractive industry in
Latin America has negatively impacted relations between
multinational companies and the local population. As a
byproduct, the privatization of humanitarian aid militarizes
security provision in the public sphere and can create
tensions between international actors and the local
population.2 Also, PMSCs reduce State control over security
issues, particularly in conflict situations like Colombia,
where PMSCs are active in the fight against drug trafficking.
In both situations, more control over PMSC‟s activities is
needed. There are several international initiatives that aim
to improve the regulation of PMSCs activities and that could
be used to improve local control. Finally, the U.S. as the
major hiring and provider of contracted PMSC, has an
interest and important responsibility in the regulation of
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P. W. Singer, Corporatewarriors: the rise of the privatized military
industry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).
2
P.W. Singer, Outsourcing War, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2005, pp.
125.
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these companies working in Latin America – or contracting
Latin American employees for missions elsewhere.

2

INTRODUCTION
The massive earthquake that rocked Haiti on 12 January
2010 created a tremendous demand for humanitarian
assistance. The chaos resulting from the complete
destruction of the infrastructures in Port-au-Prince and the
huge number of victims complicated the relief efforts
enormously. Private military and security companies
(PMSCs) saw in this situation the possibility to offer their
services to States or international organizations in order to
facilitate the humanitarian aid efforts. While Haiti offers a
recent example of the use of private security, PMSCs also
work in radically different contexts, as for instance in Peru
where a local company provides security to international
extractive industry.
PMSC can be defined as “corporations offering security,
defence and/or military services to States, international
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private
companies and/or armed groups. These services include
armed guarding and protection of persons and objects or
buildings, maintenance and operation of weapons systems,
prisoner detention and interrogation, intelligence, risk
assessment and military research analysis, as well as advice
to or training of local forces and security personnel.”3
PMSC are present throughout Latin America. In 2009, more
than 20 United States (U.S.) companies were providing
intelligence, logistic or training in Colombia. DynCorp, for
instance, has been active in Colombia since the beginning of
the 1990s. PMSCs also work in Peru, Bolivia or Mexico in
the war against narco-trafficking. Additionally, Chileans and
other Latin-American contractors are recruited by U.S.
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F. Francioni & N. Ronziti, War by Contract (London, UK: Oxford
University Press, 2011).
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PMSCs to work in other countries, such as Iraq and
Afghanistan.
All these international security tasks were once provided by
the host country public armed forces. This privatization of
security results in the presence of a non-State actor
conducting law enforcement in contexts where once only
States had jurisdiction.
In the first part of the paper, we will examine how the
growing use of PMSCs by the extractive industry in Latin
America has a negative effect on the relations between
multinational companies and local population. Additionally,
the privatization of humanitarian interventions results in the
militarization of public security in a way that has created
tensions between international organizations and the local
populations.
In a second part, the lessened control by States on security
issues will be analyzed, particularly in the context of
conflict. For instance, the use of PMSCs by the government
of the U.S. in the Colombian is especially relevant. Even
when the U.S. Congress prohibits U.S. direct participation in
the conflict, in some situations the PMSCs have engaged in
direct confrontations with Colombian subversive groups. In
both their domestic and international, more control over
PMSC‟s activities is necessary.
The third part of the paper will provide an overview of the
different international initiatives that aim to improve the
regulation of PMSCs activities and should be used to
improve domestic oversight. Finally, we will analyze the role
of the U.S. As the major hiring and home to a significant
amount of contracted PMSCs, the U.S. has both an important
responsibility and an interest in the regulation of these
4

companies working in Latin America – or contracting Latin
American employees for missions elsewhere.
PMSCS EXACERBATE TENSIONS
The increase in the privatization of security in Latin America
and the lack of oversight for PMSC activities during
peacetime or humanitarian interventions complicates
relations between local population and international actors.
PMSC AND THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY
The emerging trend of PMSCs protecting multinational
extractive corporations in Latin America has been
accompanied by harmful consequences for human rights
among local populations, which then harms the image of
multinational corporations in the region. The increased use
of PMSCs by multinational extractive corporations in
complex environments in Latin America has triggered
increased mobilization against those same corporations by
local activists and decreased the legitimacy of their
governments. One of the biggest challenges for these
corporations is to interact with the local culture in order to be
able to provide security for their employees while abiding by
respect for human right obligations. These obligations have
been defined by the United Nations (UN) Special
Representative,
Professor
John
Ruggie,
Special
Representative of the UN Secretary General on human rights
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises
in a UN framework titled, “Protect, Respect and Remedy”. 4

4

All the information about the work of the Special Representative of the
United Nations Secretary-General on business & human rights, John
Ruggie is available at the portal
http://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home.
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In order to fulfill the first task, several corporations contract
international or local PMSCs.5 PMSC managers are, in most
of cases, ex-militaries or ex-police officers and are very well
connected with the public sector and law enforcement. Their
primary function is to provide information for multinational
extractive corporations in order to help their installation in
the country. Only a few PMSCs have the capacity to collect
field information. In most of the cases PMSCs employees‟
connections guarantee excellent access tithe intelligence of
the country that they work in.
Problems appear most often when PMSCs provide protection
for the installation of the extractive corporation. According
to F. Cafferata, contracting police officers is the main
problem “due to the fact that police forces throughout Latin
America face poor working conditions. This problem
contributes to a blurring of the frontiers between public and
private security.”6
PMSCs also contract former militaries and who are often
predisposed to apply the same methods used in their previous
work. The use of military methods for security in the public
sphere during peacetime creates conditions ripe for human
rights infractions by security providers. The example of the
PMSC Forza in Peru illustrates these challenges well. Forza
was created in 1991 by a group of marine officers to offer
services of corporative security. They operate at the national
level and specialize in the extractive and industrial sector.7
On August 2006, during a protest, two environmental rights
5

We can mention as local example the Peruvian PMSC Forza or as
international example the British PMSC Team Savant working in
Colombia.
6
F. Cafferata, Privatisation of Security in Latin America: Review,
Working Papers Series, no. 3, June 2010, Global Consortium on Security
Transformation, p. 4. Available at:
http://www.securitytransformation.org/gc_publications.php.
7
La República, December 6, 2006, p. 3.
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defenders were killed by the Yanacocha mine‟s security
forces. The investigation reveals that the perpetrators were
three police officers who served on their days off as private
security guards in Forza.8 The Non-Governmental
Organization (NGO) Education and Action for Sustainable
Development Group (GRIFUDES – in Spanish), founded by
Father Marco Arana, is active in the region of the Yanacocha
mine. This NGO and other community leaders in Cajamarca
(Peru) have been subject to serious intimidation and
surveillance by the PMSC Forza. The National Human
Rights Coordinator (CNDDHH in Spanish) has recorded 20
incidents, which occurred between August and November
2006 against personnel of GRUFIDES, and at the moment
the authorities have not conducted a full investigation. 9
Other cases should also be mentioned. For instance, a
Chilean PMSC contracted by a forestry corporation was
involved in incidents against the Mapuche indigenous
community in the South of the country.10In Ecuador, the
Copper Mesa Mining Corporation used private forces to
attack and try to dislocate the Junín community.11 In
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A. Benavides de Perez, “Mercenarios, Mercenarismo y Privatización de
la Seguridad en America Latina,” in A. Perret, (ed.) Mercenarios Y
Compañías Militares y de Seguridad Privadas: Dinámicas y Retos Para
América Latina, (Universidad Externado de Colombia: Bogotá, 2010),
p117-118.
9
For more information on the case and the answer of the corporation
implicated, visit the webpage of Business and Human Rights Resource
Center at http://www.business-humanrights.org; see also United Nations,
Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Mission to
Peru, document, A/HRC/7/7/Add.2.
10
For more information see United Nations, Report of the Working
Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Mission to Chile, document,
A/HRC/6/12/Add.4.
11
For more information see the webpage of Business and Human Rights
Resource Center at http://www.business-humanrights.org; see also the
webpage of the Ecuadorian NGO Decoinhttp://www.decoin.org/ and the
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Guatemala, a similar case implicated the Canadian mining
company Goldcorp in a violation of human rights against the
local population.12 The use of PMSC by multinational
extractive corporations aggravates the complicated
relationship between multinational corporations (MNCs) and
local populations. To avoid this effect, MNCs need to
monitor the adherence to human rights standards by security
forces to protect their image both domestically and
internationally.
PMSC USE IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
Ten years ago, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan suggested
that the world was not ready to privatize peace;13 however
PMSCs are now active in the majority of peacekeeping
operations and humanitarian interventions, mostly because
states are reluctant to send their soldiers for extended periods
of time. For instance PMSCs were contracted in Haiti to
provide security services for the protection of different
organizations working in the country. But as authors A.
Buzatu and B. Buckland argue,
Humanitarian organizations often require additional
security in order to perform their missions. While
most private security companies hired by
humanitarian organizations are unarmed, in some
exceptional cases armed security is provided. It is
clear that this is a growing trend, with more and

decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, 11.03.2011 available at
http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/decisions/2011/2011ONCA0191.pdf.
12
For more information see the webpage of Business and Human Rights
Resource Center at http://www.business-humanrights.org.
13
Kofi Annan, 35th Ditchley Foundation Lecture, 26 June 1998, UN
Press Release SG/SM/6613.
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more organizations in the field hiring mostly local
private security guards.”14
As it is the case of PMSC used by multinational
corporations, the presence of ex-militaries providing public
security as a form of humanitarian assistance without
adequate accountability is not always helpful in complex
environments. This can harm the relation between the
international intervention and the local population.
According to Du Plessis, “there is also a risk of severe
reputational damage arising from an incident, undermining
the agency‟s credibility and reducing its access to the local
population and its ability to perform humanitarian
missions.”15
Headquarters Location of Companies in
Peacekeeping Operations
United States 47.6 %
European Union 38.1 %
Cyprus 9.5 %
France 4.7 %
Hungary 4.7 %
Italy 4.7 %
Spain 4.7 %
Sweden 4.7 %
United Kingdom 4.7 %
Others14.3 %
Source:
http://peaceops.org/poi/images/stories/poi_rp_industrysurvey2007.pdf.
14

A. Buzatu& B. Buckland, “Private Military & Security Companies:
Future Challenges in Security Governance,” DCAF Horizon 2015,
Working Paper n°3, 2010.
15
A.Du Plessis, “The Global Code of Conduct for Private Security
Companies: why it matters to humanitarian organisations,” Humanitarian
Exchange Magazine, Issue 47, June 2010.
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In Latin America, the case of Haiti exemplifies these
challenges. The massive earthquake that rocked Haiti on 12
January 2010 created a tremendous demand for humanitarian
assistance. The chaos resulting from the complete
destruction of the infrastructure in Port-au-Prince and the
huge number of victims complicated the relief efforts
enormously. In this context some PMSCs were contracted by
States or international organizations to provide security or
other services to help Haitian people to rebuild the country.
For instance, the PMSC Triple Canopy16 oversaw a refugee
camp;17 The PMSC Raidon Tactics18 has at least 30 former
soldiers of U.S. special operations in Haiti who have been
guarding aid convoys and providing security for news
agencies.19
At the moment, there is no real complaint against PMSCs in
the Haitian case, but criticism has been made regarding the
contribution of these companies. The previous presence of
United Nations forces on the field and the fact that the
population remained very calm despite the situation, limit the
need for external security interventions.20 However, concerns
exist because in the case of company misconduct, the
questions of who bears their responsibility remain unclear,
and in spite of “these concerns, suggestions have been made
for the expanded use of PMSCs, such as employing them as

16

http://www.triplecanopy.com/triplecanopy/en/home/.
M. Jayanti, “Providing Cover,”Journal of International Peace
Operations, vol. 5, N°6, May-June2010, p.10-12.
18
http://www.raidontactics.com/.
19
A. Fenton,“Private Contractors 'Like Vultures Coming to Grab the
Loot'”,IPS News,February 27, 2010, accessed February 12,
2011,http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=50396.
20
UNHCR protection officer by phone,(A. Perret, Interviewer)
February13, 2011,Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
17
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UN Blue Helmets or even as UN-mandated or UN-led troops
carrying out military operations.”21
EROSION OF STATE CONTROL OVER SECURITY
FORCES
The second most important effect of the privatization is the
erosion of the capacity of the State to control public security
or military issues. This is evident in the current war on drugs
in Mexico and Central America, but also in the specific
context of Colombia.
DRUG WAR IN MEXICO
The Mexican Drug War is taking place among rival drug
cartels and Mexican forces for regional control. The violence
has escalated dramatically in the last few years and in 2010
more than 12,000 people were killed.22 The U.S.is
supporting the Mexican government in its fight against drug
cartels, and part of the support is privatized: PMSCs provide
training to Mexican police. Other U.S. PMSCs are active in
Mexico, offering different services linked to “risk
management" contracts sought by individuals and
multinational companies.23 In both uses of the PMSCs, State
control the security situation is decreasing while not showing
improvements.
According to the U.S. Department of State, “the U.S.
Congress has appropriated $1.5 billion since the Mérida
21

S. Chesterman&A. Fisher, Private Security, Public Order, The
Outsourcing of Public Services and Its Limits (Oxford University Press:
New York, 2009), p. 6.
22
“Mexico's drug war: Number of dead passes 30,000,”BBC news,
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12012425.
23
N. Miroff, “As kidnappings for ransom surge in Mexico, victims'
families and employers turn to private U.S. firms instead of law
enforcement,” Washington Post, February 26, 2011.
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Initiative began in fiscal year 2008” and “the United States is
supporting Mexico‟s implementation of comprehensive
justice sector reforms through the training of justice sector
personnel including police, prosecutors, and defenders,
correction systems development, judicial exchanges, and
partnerships
between
Mexican
and
U.S.
law
schools.”24However, part of the U.S. support has been
privatized and some journalists have accused employees of
PMSCs‟ of training Mexican police in torture techniques.25
Considering that the lack of trust of the Mexican population
in law enforcement is one of the important problems at hand,
the use of PMSCs – which are by nature less controlled than
public law enforcement – is counterproductive. U.S.
PMSCs26 are also active in Mexico providing kidnapping
resolution and ransom negotiation services. These companies
are working for individuals or multinational corporations,
and they are “generally cooperative with U.S. law
enforcement […] [they] tend to maneuver as discreetly as
possible in Mexico, usually avoiding contact with authorities
who may not be trustworthy.” 27 This reinforces the
24

The Merida Initiative,
www.state.gov/documents/organization/158009.pdf.
25
“One of the videos, obtained by the newspaper El Heraldo de León,
shows police appearing to squirt water up a man's nose, a torture
technique once notorious among Mexican police. They then dunk his
head in a hole that an unidentified voice on the video says is full of
excrement and rats. In another video, an unidentified English-speaking
trainer asks a police agent to roll in his own vomit. The English-speaking
man belonged to a private U.S. security company hired to help train the
agents.” In Fox News, Report Mexico cop in torture case fired, July 19,
2008, available
athttp://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/2008Jul19/0,4675,Me
xicoPoliceTorture,00.html.
26
For instance Clayton Consultant, http://www.claytonconsultants.com/.
27
N. Miroff, “As kidnappings for ransom surge in Mexico, victims'
families and employers turn to private U.S. firms instead of law
enforcement.” February 26, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/02/26/AR2011022603384.html.
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conclusion of the previous section; the presence of PMSCs in
Mexican territory does not contribute to the reinforcement of
the credibility of the Mexican public forces.
PMSC IN CONFLICT
The use of PMSCs by the U.S. government in the Colombian
conflict is particularly relevant to the argument made here
regarding the sovereign control by States on security issues.
Since 2002, with the beginning of the Plan Colombia, the
U.S. State and Defense Departments have contracted PMSCs
in order to carry out activities related to U.S. military and
police aid to Colombia.28 This use of PMSCs has some
effects contrary to the objective of Plan Colombia which has
had limited success, especially in combating drug
trafficking.29 The use of PMSCs has helped with fortifying
the technical capacity of Colombian law enforcement and
public security and provides assistance in the difficult task of
rebuilding the Colombian State‟s legitimacy. However, if
foreign PMSCs are allowed to operate with absolute
immunity for their employees and engage directly with the
population during operations it is likely to harm the mission
of Plan Colombia.30
The loss of State control is primarily evident concerning the
circumvention of the limitation on direct U.S. participation
in operations in Colombia: the U.S. Congress prohibits all
activities that involve direct participation of the U.S. in
28

The United States Department of State, Report to Congress On Certain
Counternarcotics Activities in Colombia. Washington, 2010.
29
For details on the drug production in Colombia see the UN report:
“Colombia: monitoreo de cultivos de Coca,” Oficina de las Naciones
Unidas contra la droga y el delito, junio 2009, available at
http://www.unodc.org/colombia/es/index.html.
30
A. Perret, “Las Compañias Militares y/o de Seguridad Privadas en
Colombia:¿Una nueva forma de mercenarismo?,” Pretexto n°34
(Universidad Externado de Colombia: Bogotá, 2009).
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combat hostilities. Moreover, the U.S. law limits the
outsourcing of “inherently governmental functions,”31 in
other words PMSCs are not authorized to perform functions
in an area of combat operations.32 In spite of this prohibition,
it is possible to note direct participation of certain US
PMSCs in the Colombian conflict.33For instance DynCorp34
holds a contract with the U.S. State Department to fumigate
illegal cultivation, but also “training, air transport, aircraft
maintenance, reconnaissance, and search and rescue
operations35 which are focused on locating and shutting
down aircrafts or hostile actions taken by drug producers or
traffickers.”36 During the operations of fumigations, two or
three combat helicopters accompany the planes37 that drop
the glyphosate, because aircraft attacks are frequent.38
31

“OMB Circular No.A-76: Performance of Commercial Activities,”
Revised 2003 (Circular A-76) (White House Office of Management and
Budget, Washington, DC, May 29, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a076_a76_incl_tech_correctio
n.
32
See a detailed study of the US Law in Kristine A. Huskey, “The
American Way: Private Military Contractors & U.S. Law After 9/11,”
Priv-War national report (European University Institute: Florence, 2010)
available at http://priv-war.eu.
33
A. Perret, “Las Compañias Militares y/o de Seguridad Privadas en
Colombia:¿Una nueva
forma de mercenarismo?”
34
http://www.dyn-intl.com/.
35
DynCorp-State Department Contract, 2001
inhttp://www.corpwatch.org.
36
I. Cabrera, & A. Perret, (2009) Colombia: Regulating Private Military
and Security Companies in a “Territorial State”, Priv-War National
Reports, 19/09, European University Institute, Florence, available at
http://priv-war.eu.
37
United States Government Accountability Office, GAO, Drug Control,
Report to the Honorable Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Caucus on
International Narcotics Control, U.S. Senate(Washington: GAO, 2004),
p9.
38
Between 2001 and 2002, around ten attacks per month took place,
increasing in 2003 to reach a peak of 73 attacks per month. These
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The helicopters “have a mixed crew composed of both
contractors and members of the National Police,”39 which are
armed and ready to fire on the aggressors. Even if the
Colombian National Police is supposed to assume
responsibility for helicopter gunships, there is no effective
control of contractors‟ activities. The absence of effective
control has been corroborated by an anonymous U.S.
Embassy employee that stated, “The U.S. Embassy, which is
supposed to be in charge of the following of all the contracts,
does not effectively oversee DynCorp‟s activities. The
PMSC is in charge of hiring the employees, and providing
the necessary material - the U.S. government is interested
only in outcomes.”40 The Intelligence Authorization Act of
November 200341 expands the use of PMSC participation in
the Colombian conflict42 because intelligence services can be
used not only in the fight against drug trafficking but also in
the fight against terrorism.43 This means funds can be used to
fight irregular groups.

numbers have since decreased and now the average is 26 attacks per
month. Ibid. p. 1.
39
“Mercenarios,” Semana, August 13, 2001, nº1002, Bogotá. Author‟s
translation.
40
Employee of the US Embassy in Bogotá, (A. Perret interviewer) May
4, 2007, Quoted in I. Cabrera& A. Perret, “Colombia: Regulating Private
Military and Security Companies in a „Territorial State‟.”
41
In its 313th section “use of funds for counterdrug and counterterrorism
activities for Colombia” the act authorizes the use of intelligence funds
used in counterdrug activities to be used in counterterrorism activities
against FARC, ELN, and AUC, with the objective of protecting health
and human life in emergency situations, including rescue operations.
Senate of the United States of America, FY2004 Intelligence
Authorization Act. Report, 2003, p108-163.
42
Defined as a conflict by the Colombian government in the law “on
victims” voted by the parliament on May 2011, see: Semana, Ley de
Victimas, Edición 1517, May 28, 2011.
43
C. Veillette, “Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related
Funding Programs: FY2005 Assistance,” Washington: Congressional
Research Service & The Library of Congress, 2005.
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The consequences of this lack of control can be dramatic
considering that US PMSCs‟ employees are granted
immunity from Colombian jurisdiction by U.S. agreement.
Such is the case in two incidences of the rape of minors
involving PMSCs‟ employees. One of them occurred on a
military base and is under investigation but the justice
system has its hands tied because of PMSC immunity;44 the
other case was not investigated.45
IMPROVING CONTROL: INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES
AND NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
This lack of control and accountability of PMSCs has come
under attack from various sides. During the past five years,
different international initiatives have emerged and provide a
starting point to regulate and control PMSCs activities. At
the international level, in 2005 the United Nations created
the UN Working Group on Mercenaries to investigate
mercenaries and their role in violating human rights and
impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to selfdetermination. In September 2010, the UN Working Group
on Mercenaries presented the first draft of a convention to
the General Assembly. In parallel, another initiative, led by
Switzerland, has produced two international documents: the
Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct
(ICoC). These two initiatives have very different objectives:
the UN document would become a binding instrument of
international law, while the so-called “Swiss Initiative” may
be considered soft-law (Montreux Document) and voluntary
regulation (ICoC).

44

“Investigan a dos militares de E.U. por violación de niña de 12 años en
Comando Aéreo de Melgar.”El Tiempo, October 7, 2007, p 1.
45
D. Murcia, Lawyer, Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo, (A.
Perret, Interviewer) Bogotá, October 19, 2007.
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The first draft convention presented in 2010 at the United
Nations is the beginning of a new long process. It reaffirms
the States‟ responsibility of legitimate use of force and
includes interesting elements on limitation of outsourcing,
defining inherently States functions. It aims to regulate
PMSC activities in all types of contexts, not only in conflict
situations. Nevertheless, the draft convention is currently
under discussion and its application could still take a long
time. Therefore, at the moment, the only international
document that could provide guidance to States and common
standards to control multinational PMSCs activities is the
Montreux Document. The United States has participated
actively in the negotiation of the Montreux Document and is
part of the 17 nations that have first endorsed the document.
For these reasons, it is recommended here that the U.S.
should take the lead to establish accountability and accept
responsibility for the respect of human rights by U.S.PMSCs.
The application of the Montreux Document is restricted to
conflict situations and refers mainly to international
humanitarian law. It is composed of two main parts, the first
on pertinent legal obligations regarding PMSCs – „hard‟
laws binding under custom or treaty – and the second on
good practices regarding PMSC – „soft standards‟–. By
being part of this document, the U.S. abides by and
recognizes the constraints of immunity in regards to
contractors and the enforcement of human rights and
humanitarian law rules. The second part of the Montreux
Document recommends States to select PMSCs carefully,
with transparent processes according to criteria that account
for the past services, background, resources, and personnel
policies of firms.46
The selection of PMSC employees is fundamental, “in the
Iraqi context, […] US officials and PMSCs alike often
46

Montreux Document, part 2, para 2 - 9.
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encountered difficulties in vetting individuals hired from
countries in Africa, South America, and elsewhere.”47 This
problem also concerns Latin America and international
collaboration is needed. For instance “there was an outcry in
Chile as well as in the international press when it was
revealed that several Chilean subcontractors working in Iraq
were Pinochet-era commandos who had been forced to retire
from the military for their role in the crimes of that
regime.”48
On a parallel basis, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign
Affairs has prepared a PMSC industry follow-up initiative to
the Montreux Document: the International Code of Conduct
(ICoC). This code articulates principles for PMSC to operate
in accordance with international humanitarian law and
international human rights standards and was signed by
nearly 60 companies in Geneva on 9 November 2010.49 A
group of stakeholders composed by civil society and industry
representatives are now preparing external independent
mechanisms for an effective governance and oversight of the
ICoC.
Meritorious international initiatives often confront
difficulties when being implemented and may have different
impact on the ground. The current base for implementation is
invariably rooted at the national level. In a world of
sovereign States, multilateral commitments are only effective
when given concrete expression in national legislation and
institutions. Thus, States have the final responsibility to
47

C. Spear in, “What Montreux Means: Canada and the New Regulation
of the International Private Military and Security Industry,” Canadian
Foreign Policy, Volume 16, 2010, Issue 1, p. 6.
48
K. McCoy, “Yesterday‟s Civil Warriors, Today‟s Global Guards: Latin
Americans in the Privatized Military Industry,” 2010, p154-155, in A.
Perret, “Mercenarios Y Compañías Militares y de Seguridad Privadas.”
49
http://www.admin.ch/aktuell/00089/index.html?lang=en&msgid=36144. For more information see also: www.icoc-psp.org.
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regulate and improve control over PMSC. For this to be
effective, the States must integrate the context of the
international initiatives into their own domestic legislation.
CONCLUSION
The current privatization of the security in Latin America
entails a risk for the progress of human rights and democratic
values. As discussed above, the privatization of humanitarian
interventions and the use of private military and security
companies (PMSC) by Multinational Corporation tend to
militarize civilian tasks and complicate relations between
international organizations and the local population.
Consequences are negative for local people – who suffer
human rights violations – and for the companies or
international organizations that hire these PMSCs – which
suffer reputational and credibility damage. The privatization
of military tasks also has implications for the States. During
armed conflict or drug war, the use of PMSC implies the
presence of a non-State actor allowed to use force in contexts
where once only States were allowed to do so.
All of the cases mentioned here demonstrate the need for
more control and different international initiatives. The UN
draft convention and the Swiss Initiative composed by the
Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct
(ICoC) aim to provide international standards to help States
to confront these challenges. The three documents are
complementary but the UN draft convention is still under
discussion and will probably take time to arrive to its final
version. Taking into account that the U.S. has already
endorsed the Montreux Document on PMSCs and is the
major provider of private security services and personnel in
the region, it should promote abiding by the human rights
standards included in the ICoC. Also, it should only contract
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signatory PMSCs‟ – and include the code of conduct in the
contract. The US should also integrate the code into its
domestic law and require all the U.S. PMSCs to sign it.
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